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Abstract
In this paper we present a mechanism for determining near-
optimal pricesfor tasksinonline labor markets, often usedfor
crowdsourcing. In particular, the mechanisms are designed to
handle the intricacies of markets like Mechanical Turk where
workers arrive online and requesters have budget constraints.
The mechanism is incentive compatible, budget feasible, and
has competitive ratio performance and also performs well in
practice. To demonstrate the mechanism’s practical effective-
ness we conducted experiments on the Mechanical Turk plat-
form.
1 Introduction
Online labor markets have recently emerged as an effective
way to crowdsource cognitive work. Marketplaces such as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mtu ) enable requesters to post
tasks that are then performed by hundreds of thousands of
geographically distributed workers. One of the main chal-
lenge requesters face is in providing appropriate incentives
for workers. More concretely, requesters need to establish
rewards that are attractive to workers, and yet enable out-
sourcing a large number of assignments without exceeding
the budget.
To price tasks effectively, requesters need to address var-
ious challenges unique to online labors markets. For exam-
ple, requesters are often motivated to pick simple tasks that
have a large number of assignments, with an intent to maxi-
mize the number of assignments performed.This is in sharp
contrast to traditional procurement markets dominated by
large contractors who offer expensive, specialized services
to address complex tasks and rely on a small number of
workers. One step towards creating reasonable incentives is
to estimate the workers’ costs for performing these experi-
ments. It is difﬁcult to establish a representative cost distri-
bution for these since the worker pool is typically geograph-
ically and economically diverse. Also, worker availability
changes over time, and the task requester has to account for
the online arrival of workers. Additionally, tasks typically
don’trequirespecializationbut scale. The requesters specify
a budget, and will typically wish to maximize the number of
assignments performed under the budget.
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In this paper we address the problem of pricing tasks in
online labor markets by developing mechanisms that itera-
tively sample and allow work to the workers based on their
bids for a given set of tasks. To establish a theoretical foun-
dation, we ﬁrst describe a natural model that captures the
main intricacies of the problem. Our main contribution is a
pricing mechanism that dynamicallyprices and allocates as-
signments to workers based on their cost. We show that the
mechanism has desirable theoretical guarantees and that it
also performs well in practice.
The main idea behind the mechanism is to use the bids
solicited from workers in an intelligent manner. At every
stage the mechanism allocates assignments to an arriving
worker only if her cost is below a certain threshold price
thathasbeencomputedusingpreviousbids,andpaysherthe
threshold price. The threshold price is computed in a man-
ner that guarantees desirable performance properties of the
mechanism. The properties of the mechanism are incentive
compatibility, budget feasibility and competitive ratio per-
formance, and are based on the theoretical foundations of
mechanismdesign and online algorithms. Informally,incen-
tive compatibility ensures workers bid their true costs, bud-
get feasibility ensures the requesters budget constraint is not
violated, and competitive ratio guarantees that in expecta-
tion over a random arrival order of workers the mechanism
performs close to the optimal solution that would have been
obtainable had the requester known the bidders true costs a
priori to their arrival.
Related Work
There has been signiﬁcant research in determining the ap-
propriate price for crowdsourced-tasks. For example, (Hor-
ton and Chilton 2010) have developed and experimentally
validatedmodelsforestimatingthelaborsupplyforacrowd-
sourcing task. The hagglebot(Horton and Zeckhauser 2010)
haggles with workers to minimize the price paid for com-
pletion of tasks. Mechanical turk (mtu ) like plaforms also
compute and suggest the expected price per worker hour.
Interestingly, research (Mason and Watts 2010) indicates
that the quality of the work is invariant to the price paid,
and that workers might be motivated by different incen-
tives (Shaw, Horton, and Chen 2011). Prediction market ap-
proaches (Chen and Vaughan 2010) can also be useful for
improving the quality of results.The problem of designing mechanism for procurement
auctions has been extensively studied by the algorithmic
game theory community over the past decade. The ear-
lier line of frugality ﬁrst suggested in (Archer and Tardos
2002) focused minimizing payments for complex objective
functions, and is not directly applicable to our setting. Re-
cently, the budget feasibility framework has been initiated
in (Singer 2010), where the goal is to design incentive com-
patible mechanisms that maximize a requester’s objective
under a budget. The framework has been adopted in to var-
ious online settings and we follow it in this paper, though
in our model we account for the online arrival of workers,
which raises a signiﬁcant challenge. To address the online
arrival of workers we assume that the arrival of workers is
randomas commonin literature (Hajiaghayi,Kleinberg,and
Parkes 2004; Babaioff et al. 2008). While there is a grow-
ing body of literature on algorithm design in this model for
problems like knapsack (Babaioff et al. 2007), assortative
matching (Babaioff et al. 2009) and submodular function
maximization (Gupta et al. 2010), it has not been studied
for procurement, as our setting requires. Since our goal is
to design incentive compatible mechanisms, we cannot re-
ward workers their cost, and must compute a price online in
a manner that does not exceed the budget.
2 The Model
The task pricing problem can be formally described as
follows. There is a single requester who posts a task in an
online labor market, and n potential workers for that task,
denoted N. In each task there are m available assignments.
The workers arrive online in a random order1.
The workers. Each worker ai associates a private cost
ci ∈ R≥0 for performing a single assignment as well as
a limit ti for the number of assignments she is willing to
work on. That is, for a worker ai we do not know a priori
what ci, at most ti assignments can be allocated to ai and
the payment for each assignment must exceed ci.
The requester. The requester has a public budget
B ∈ R≥0 and utility function f : 2[m] → R≥0 over the
subsets of assignments performed. In this paper we study
the case where f is additive, i.e. f(S) =
P
i∈S vi, where
vi is the value the requester assigns for each assignment.
The common case we will discuss most in the paper is
where vi = 1 ∀i ∈ [m] (or equivalently, f(S) = |S| ),
i.e. the requester simply aims to maximize the number of
assignments performed 2.
The mechanism. The goal in this setting is to design a
mechanism that allocates assignments to workers in a man-
1Due to the impossibility results for arbitrary orderings, we use
the standard secretary model where the assumption is that the order
or arrival is not adversarial but random, as common in literature of
dynamic mechanism design (Babaioff et al. 2007)
2Our model extends to general requester functions that are not
necessarily additive, and we discuss these general cases further in
the paper
ner that yields a good outcome. A mechanism M = (f,p)
consists of an allocation function f : Rn
≥0 → 2[n] and a
payment function p : Rn
≥0 → Rn
≥0. The allocation func-
tion f maps a set of n bids to an allocation of assignments
for a selected subset of workers. The payment function p re-
turnsa vectorp1,...,pn of paymentsto the workers.We are
interestedin mechanismswhere boththe allocation andpay-
ments functions are polynomial-time computable. We seek
normalized (pi > 0 implies ai is allocated), individually
rational (pi ≥ ci) mechanisms with no positive transfers
(pi ≥ 0). In addition, our objective is to design a mecha-
nism that is:
• Incentive Compatible. Since workers may report false
costs if it is in their beneﬁt, we seek incentive compatible
(truthful)mechanismsforwhichreportingthetruecosts is
a dominant strategy. Formally, a mechanism M = (f,p)
is incentive compatible if for every ai ∈ N with cost ci
and bid c′
i, and every set of bids by N \ {ai} we have
pi − si   ci ≥ p′
i − s′
i   ci, where (si,pi) and (s′
i,p′
i) are
the allocations and payments when the bidding is ci and
c′
i, respectively.
• Budget Feasible. We require the mechanism to be bud-
get feasible: the mechanism’s paymentsdo not exceed the
budget:
P
i pi ≤ B.
• Competitive. The goal of the mechanism is to maximize
the expected value of the requester’s objective function,
where the expectation is over the random arrival order
of the workers. In the simple case we want to maximize
the expected number of assignments performed.To quan-
tify the performance of the mechanism we compare its
solution with the optimal solution: the solution obtain-
able in the ofﬂine scenario where all costs are known.
A mechanism is O(g(n))-competitive if the ratio be-
tween the optimal solution and the online mechanism is
O(g(n)). Ideally, we would like our mechanism to be
O(1)-competitive.
It might seem that achieving all three desiderata simulta-
neously is too much to hope for. As shown in (Singer 2010)
where budget feasibility is introduced, designing incentive
compatible mechanisms whose sum of payments are under
thebudgetis nottrivial,andtherearesimpleinstanceswhere
thisobjectivecannotbeachieved.Inaddition,we requireour
mechanism to perform well despite the random arrival order
of the workers. Despite these challenges, the framework for
designingmechanismsinthisenvironmentwe presentinthis
paper allows satisfying these conditions simultaneously.
3 The Mechanism
Apricingmechanismforonlinelabormarketsneedsto over-
come several nontrivial challenges. First, the workers’ costs
are unknown and need to be elicited in a manner that incen-
tivizes truthful reporting, without having the total payments
exceed the requester’s budget. In addition, the mechanism
needs to accommodate for the online arrival of the workers.
The standard approach to achieve desirable outcomes in on-
line settings is via sampling: the ﬁrst batch of the input isrejected and used as a sample which enables making an in-
formeddecision on the rest of the input.Althoughthe model
we use here assumes the workers’ arrival order is random
and is not controlled by the workers, a standard sampling
approach may be impractical: workers are likely to be dis-
couraged to work on tasks knowing the pricing mechanism
will automatically reject their bid.
To address the abovechallenges, we use the followingap-
proach. At each stage the mechanism maintains a threshold
price which is used to decide whether to accept the work-
ers’ bids. The mechanism dynamically increases the sample
size and updates the threshold price, while increasing the
budget it uses for allocation. As a result, workers are not au-
tomatically rejected during the sampling, and are allocated
when their cost is below the established threshold price. The
threshold prices are set in such a way that ensures budget
feasibility and incentive compatibility.
As a ﬁrst step, we describe the procedureused to establish
threshold price, and discuss some of its properties.
GetThreshold
Require: B,S
initialize: sort S s.t. c1 ≤ ... ≤ c|S|
while ci ≤ B P
j≤i tj do:
i ←− i + 1
ti ←− min
n
ti,
j
B−ci 
P
j<i ti
ci
ko
Output: min
n
B P
j≤i tj,
ci+1
ti+1
o
Theaboveprocedurereceivesa workers’bidproﬁleS and
a budget B. The bid proﬁle describes, for each worker, the
minimal cost they associate for performing a single assign-
ment and the maximal number of assignments they are will-
ing to work on. The procedure computes a threshold price:
a single price-per-task that can used to decide whether to
accept or reject a bid. Since workers can work on fewer as-
signments then the maximal number of assignments they in-
dicated, the procedureallows for fractional solutions: Inside
the iterative loop, the procedure updates the number of as-
signmentstobetheminimumbetweenthenumberofassign-
ments the worker requested and the number of assignments
that are available, given the worker’s cost and the remaining
budget.
Before we describe how the mechanism uses the above
procedure, we prove a desirable property of the threshold
prices. The proof of the lemma below can be easily derived
from propertiesof the proportionalshare mechanismfor the
symmetric submodular case that are shown (Singer 2010),
and is presented here for completeness.
Lemma 3.1. Given a ﬁxed budget and and bid proﬁle
of costs and maximal assignments workers are willing to
perform, let t∗ be the maximal number of assignments
that can be performed. Then at least t
∗
2 of the assign-
ments have cost below the threshold price computed by the
GetThreshold procedure.
Proof. Givenaﬁxedbudget,theoptimalsolutionis consider
workers according to a minimal cost ordering and allocate
ti assignments to each worker ai as long as the total cost
does not exceed the budget and use the remaining budget
to the last worker. For a given set of workers a1,...,an,
assume, w.l.o.g. that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. Let aℓ be the last
worker allocated by the optimal solution and let ak be the
last worker who can be allocated by the above procedure.
For purpose of this analysis we assume, w.l.o.g, that ak and
aℓ have been allocated all their assignments and that tk+1 =
1. We can assume this since otherwise, if only a fraction
of tk assignments are allocated to ak, we can consider an
equivalent instance where we have n + tk + tk+1 + tℓ − 3
workers, which consists of the original N \ {ak,ak−1,aℓ}
workers, and for each i = k,k + 1,ℓ we replace ai with ti
workers, each with cost ci, willing to work on at most one
assignment.
First observe that ck+1 
Pℓ
i=k+1 ti ≤
Pℓ
i=k+1 ci ti < B
and therefore ck+1 < B Pℓ
i=k+1 ti. One the other hand, we
know that ck+1 > B P
i≤k+1 ti. We can therefore conclude
that
Pk+1
i=1 ti >
Pℓ
i=k+1 ti and in particular, since tk+1 = 1
we have that:
Pk
i=1 ti ≥ 1
2
Pℓ
i=1 ti.
The above lemma implies that if we accept all assign-
ments that have cost that is smaller than the threshold price,
we will be able to complete at least half of the assignments
we would have been able to complete if we paid each
worker their cost. Intuitively, as one can imagine, once the
sample size is large enough, the threshold prices obtained
on the sample will be “close enough” to the real threshold
price. We give a a formal description of our mechanism
below.
An Online Mechanism for Task Pricing
Require: B,n
initialize:
(n′,B′,p,S,i,A) ← ( n
2⌊log n⌋, B
2⌊log n⌋,ǫ,{a1},1,∅)
while i ≤ n do:
if i = n′
p∗ ←− GetThreshold(B′,S)
(n′,B′,p,A) ←− (2   n′,2   B′,p∗,∅)
if ci ≤ p
t′
i ←− min
n
ti,
jB
′−(
P
aj∈A tj)
p
ko
Allocate t′
i assignments, pay p for each
S ←− S ∪ {(ci,ti)}
i ←− i + 1
Output: S
The mechanism initially sets a small threshold, sample
size and budget. At each stage i ∈ {1,2,...,⌊logn⌋},
the mechanism updates its threshold price by calling the
GetThreshold procedure with the bids it has sampledthus far. For every bidder that appears, the mechanism al-
locates tasks to the bidder as long as her cost is below the
threshold price established, and the budget allocated for the
stage hasn’t been exhausted. In the last stage i = ⌊logn⌋,
the threshold price has been computed for a sample of size
n
2, and the budget used is B
2 . We will now prove some of its
desirable properties.
Lemma 3.2. The mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof. At each stage i ∈ {1,2,...,⌊logn⌋}, we set a bud-
get B′ = Bi and threshold price pi. The condition of the
mechanism is such that the numberof assignments allocated
at stage i does not exceed Bi
pi , and since each assignment
is rewarded pi, we have budget feasibility in each stage i.
Since
P
i Bi =
P⌊log n⌋
i=1
B
2i < B the mechanism is budget
feasible.
Proposition 3.3. The mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. Consider a worker ai with cost of ci that arrives at
some stage for which the threshold price was set to p. If by
the time the worker arrives there are no remaining assign-
ments, then the worker’s cost declaration will not affect the
allocation of the mechanism and thus cannot beneﬁt for re-
porting a false cost. Otherwise, assume there are remaining
assignments by the time the worker arrives. In case ci ≤ p,
reporting any cost below p wouldn’t make a difference in
the worker’s allocation and payment and her utility for each
assignment would be p − ci ≥ 0. Declaring a cost above p
would denythe worker from any tasks, and her utility would
be 0. In case ci > p, declaring any cost above p would leave
the worker unallocated with utility 0. If the worker declares
a cost lower than p she will be allocated. In such a case,
however, her utility will be negative and she is thus better
off reporting her true cost.
To show the mechanism performs well, we will make the
simplifying assumption that all workers have the same limit
on the number of assignments they can perform.
Theorem 3.4. For sufﬁciently large n, when all workers
have the same assignment limit, the mechanism is O(1)-
competitive.
Proof. In the last stage of the mechanism the budget used
is B
2 and the sampled subset is of size n
2. Since all work-
ers have the same limit, we can assume the limit is 1 (oth-
erwise normalize the budget). Let p be the threshold price
computed by GetThreshold in the ofﬂine case (the price
that is computedwhen all n workers are considered),and let
T be the set of workers in N with cost below p. Note that
p ≤ B
|T| ≤ p′ where p′ is the threshold price computed from
the sample. The number of workers from T in the sample
follows a hypergeometric distribution, and for sufﬁciently
large n, the probability that there are
|T|
2 workers from T in
the sample is close to 1
2. In this case p′ ≤ 2B
|T|, and we have
|T|
2 workers not in the sample, who have cost below p ≤ p′.
If a worker from T who is not in the sample is not allo-
cated by our mechanism, it can therefore only be because
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Costs/Assignment
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
B
i
d
s
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Assignment Limits
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
B
i
d
s
Figure 1: (a) Histogram of price per assignment (0-40 cents)
requested by bidders(b) Histogram of number of assign-
ments requested by bidders
the budget has been exhausted. Since p′ ≤ 2B
|T| with proba-
bility close to 1
2, at least
|T|
2 workers have been allocated.
The mechanism thefore returns at least half of the ofﬂine
solution that is computed with budget B
2 . From the above
lemma, and the fact that we are using a constant fraction of
the budget, we get that expectation the mechanism provides
a constant factor approximation to the optimal ofﬂine opti-
mal solution, and is therefore O(1)-competitive.
4 Experimental Evaluation
Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we would like to show
that the mechanism performs well in practice. In addition,
we would like to show that allowing workers to express
their costs is a feasible approach that can be easily imple-
mented. For this purpose we created an experiment on Me-
chanical Turk where workers were asked to bid on assign-
ments we created and the mechanism was used for alloca-
tion. We found that the mechanism does very well on real
inputs and the threshold prices converge quickly. We also
found that workers producedhigh quality results and impor-
tantly responded positively to the bidding method. We de-
scribe the experiment in detail below followed by analysis
and discussion of the main results.
Description of the Experiment
The primary objective of the experiment was to collect bids
in order to compare the mechanism’s performance on de-
scriptive inputs against various benchmarks.Our second ob-
jective was to test whether the bidding method has an ef-
fect on workers’ performance. To conduct the experiment
we created a web application that generates human compu-
tationassignments.We implementedthebiddingmechanism
in the application so that assignments were automatically
generated to workers who were allocated. We used the Me-
chanicalTurkto directworkerstotheapplication,byposting
it as a standard Human Intelligence Task (HIT) available to
workers on the Mechanical Turk platform. This allowed us
to collect bids from workers and measure the performance
of the allocated workers on the assignments.
In the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) workers were ex-
plained that a mechanism will decide how many assign-
ments, if any, will be allocated to them based on their bid.
We explained to workers they would be paid through theMechanical Turk bonus payment system, which allows a
requester to pay workers beyond the ﬁxed price associated
with the HIT. To encouragehigh quality work, we explained
to workers they would be paid if their work will be found
unsatisfactory. We also included a screenshot from an ex-
ample assignment so that workers could assess their cost
for performing the assignment prior to bidding. Following
the set of instructions, workers had to indicate their cost for
performing an assignment and how many assignments they
wish to perform. Their bids were collected by our mech-
anism that then decided on their allocation. A worker that
wasallocatedreceivedassignmentstoworkon,andbasedon
the pricing decided by the mechanism was paid within a few
days viathe bonuspaymentsystem. Eachworkerthat placed
a bid was paid for participating in the HIT, independent of
the payments made according to the mechanism’s decision.
In the control of the experiment,workers were only asked to
indicate the numberof tasks they wish to work on for a ﬁxed
price of $0.03.
The assignments required workers to estimate area sizes
in pie charts.Each assignmentincludedsix pie charts, where
each pie chart consisted of three colors, one of which was
red. In each assignment, the workers were required to esti-
mate the percentage of red color in each one of the six pie
charts. The area sizes in the pie charts were randomly gen-
erated. We chose this assignment since it simulates a human
computation assignment and allows us to objectively quan-
tify a worker’s performance.As common on the Mechanical
Turk platform we ran the experiment in several HIT batches
to promote it in the list of list of available HITs presented to
workers. The payment for participation was $0.05. We also
gaveworkersanoptiontosendus feedbackabouttheirexpe-
rience. We limited the experiment to workers with approval
rate higher than 90%. At the time of writing, the application
is accessible (Singer and Mittal ).
Experimental Results
There were 2255 bids where each bid consisted of the max-
imal number of assignments they are willing to work on and
their cost for performingan assignment. We restricted work-
ers to 25 assignments and their bid per assignment had to be
below $0.40. In total, there were 2215 legal bids (there were
40 illegal bids we discarded where the bid was below $0.01
or above $0.40). We plot the cost and requested assignment
distributions in Figure 1 below.
Although the main measure of performance we consider
in this paper is the number of assignments that can be per-
formed under the budget, we examined the quality of the
work performedas well. Showingthat workers performwell
on their allocated assignments helps exclude concerns re-
garding negative effects the bidding method may have. To
examine the performance of workers we chose the percent-
age estimation assignment since it allows us to objectively
quantify workers’ performance by considering their errors
from the true answer. In total, our mechanism allocated to
161 workers who, in aggregate, submitted 10870 answers
(we count the number of answers submitted for each pie
chart).
The error distribution is presented in Figure 2(a). In
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Figure 2: (a) Histogram of errors. (b) Average error (Y) vs
bid price in cents (X)
general, workers performed well on the assignments. The
worker mean error was 2.37, and almost all workers who
were allocated assignments by the mechanism completed
their assignments. This was consistent with the control
group of 32 workers who received a ﬁxed price reward,
where the mean error was 2.64. This leads us to assume that
the performance is not negatively affected by the bidding
method.
A subject of ongoing debate in the crowdsourcing com-
munity is the relationship between performance and mon-
etary incentives. To examine this in our context we com-
pared a worker’s average error on the assignments per-
formed against their bid. The average error reﬂects on the
quality of work, and the bid indicates the reward the worker
expects to receive. We plot the worker’s bid against their av-
erage error in Figure 2(b). In our examination we found no
signiﬁcant correlation. We note the data for this comparison
involves only 161 workers, since this is the total number of
workers who were allocated assignments by the mechanism.
To test the performance of the mechanism, we used the
2215 bids collected and compared our mechanism against
several benchmarks. Note that in order to show how many
assignments can be allocated given a speciﬁed budget, we
only require the workers’ bids, which is a much larger set
than the subset of workers that were actually allocated and
submitted their answers to the assignments. To simulate a
task we use a random permutation of the bids we collected
to model the random arrival of workers, and run our mecha-
nism with a speciﬁed budget over this ordering.
First, to see how quicklythe thresholdprices of the mech-
anism converge, we simulated tasks with various budgets
and ran the mechanism. In Figure 3(a) we plot the thresh-
old price against the number of workers that appear on a
logarithmicscale, when a budget of $1000was used. As one
can see, the threshold price quickly stabilizes and remains
almost constant throughout the run.
We compared our mechanism against the following
benchmarks.The ﬁrst benchmarkis the optimal ofﬂine algo-
rithm which has full knowledge about workers costs. This is
the benchmark we used to analytically compare our mecha-
nism’s performancein the abovesection. The second bench-
mark is the proportional share mechanism. This mecha-
nism is the optimal ofﬂine incentive compatible and bud-
get feasible mechanism which was introduced in (Singer10
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Figure 3: (a) Variation of threshold price over time (b) Com-
parative performance of algorithms
2010). Essentially, the proportional share allocation mech-
anism is the basis for GetThreshold procedure we use
in our mechanism. This mechanism does not have knowl-
edge about worker’s costs, but it is an ofﬂine mechanism,
i.e., all workers submit their bids to the mechanism and wait
for the mechanism to collect all the bids and decideon an al-
location. The other benchmarks are ﬁxed price mechanisms
where a single price is offered to agents, and if their cost is
below that price they accept and otherwise reject. We used
ﬁxed price mechanisms with $0.03 as used in the control,
and $0.01128 which is the mean of the bids.
The ﬁrst two benchmarks operate in simpler settings,
where all the costs are known a priori and will therefore al-
ways outperformourmechanism.We showedthat the mech-
anism is guaranteed to be, in expectation over the arrival or-
der of the workers, within a constant factor from the optimal
ofﬂine solution. Our goal in this experiment is to examine
this ratio on descriptive inputs. The ﬁxed price benchmark
that uses the mean of the bids also assumes the costs are
known, and while it performs arbitrarily bad in the worst
case, the a priori knowledge of the costs can potentially al-
low it to outperform our mechanism. In Figure 3(b) we plot
the resulting comparison between our mechanism and the
various benchmarks. Using the bids provided by workers,
we simulated the different algorithms on budgets ranging
from $50 to $1000 in increments of $50.
The mechanism performs quite well in comparison with
the various benchmarks. Although it is only guaranteed to
be within a competitive factor of about 16 of the optimal
ofﬂine solution, the experiments show that this ratio is al-
most as small as two. As comparedto the proportionalshare
mechanism, this ratio decreases below two. The mechanism
that uses the mean of bids as its ﬁxed price is a clear lower
bound. Lastly, it appears the na¨ ıve solution of posting ﬁxed
prices even with knowledge of the workers’ costs results in
poor performancein practice as well. The ﬁxed price bench-
marks of $0.03levels off as the numberof workerswith bids
smaller than $0.03is ﬁnite, and exhausted by a large enough
budget.
5 Discussion
The mechanism we presentedin this paper has provablethe-
oretical guarantees and performs well in practice. Impor-
tantly, the pricing mechanism suggested here is simple to
implement. While it can be implemented by a platform for
online labor markets as an alternative to the commonly-used
ﬁxed-price method, it can be implemented by requesters as
well. In a similar manner that we executed the experiment
describedin this paper,a requester can implementthe mech-
anism and apply it to price its tasks. We intend to make this
tasksimpleforrequestersandincludeanapplicationthrough
which requesters could post tasks on Mechanical Turk in a
manner that will automatically implement the mechanism.
The model seems adequate for online labor markets, and
we believe there is room for future that will use this model.
In general, requesters may have objectives that are more
complex, and it would be interesting to extend our results
for such cases as well.
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